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Abstract. This paper investigates whether female political empowerment is conducive to civil
peace, drawing on global data on female political empowerment over a 200 year period, from the
Varieties of Democracy database. We augment previous research by expanding the temporal scope,
looking at a novel inventory of female empowerment measures, attending to reverse-causality and
omitted variable issues, and separating between relevant causal mechanisms. We find a strong link
between female political empowerment and civil peace, which is particularly pronounced in the
20th century. When studying mechanisms, we find that this relationship is driven both by women’s
political participation and the culture that conduces it. To draw causal inferences, we estimate
instrumental variable models and perform causal sensitivity tests. This is the strongest evidence to
date that there is a robust link between female political empowerment and civil peace, stemming
from both institutional and cultural mechanisms.
Keywords: gender equality, civil war, culture, female empowerment, armed conflict
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1 Introduction
It is commonly held that societies that empower women are less prone to civil violence. Notably,
the rise of gender-egalitarian attitudes is central to historical accounts of the long-term decline
of violence. In narratives such as Pinker’s (2011), a cultural change wherein women’s rights and
perspectives are increasingly valued and respected on par with those of men is one of the structural
forces propelling societies towards peace.
While the female empowerment-conflict link has received deserved attention from a number
of conflict scholars (for an overview, see e.g. Reiter, 2014), finding some support (e.g. Melander,
2005; Schaftenaar, 2017), the “feminization thesis” is not yet on firm footing. We augment existing
literature in four ways. First, existing studies are limited in temporal scope – being restricted to
the final decades of the 20th century. This means that important historical advances in female
empowerment are left out, such as the suffrage expansions in the early and mid 20th century, and
extensions in women’s civil liberties in the 19th century. Second, the existing evidence draws on
a handful of female empowerment indicators, focusing on socioeconomic empowerment, such as
women’s labor force participation or fertility rates (e.g. Schaftenaar, 2017; Caprioli, 2005), or the
number of female politicians (e.g. Melander, 2005). While important, these omit crucial aspects of
female empowerment, such as women’s civil liberties, participation in civil society or the right to
vote. Third, there are few attempts to tackle omitted-variable bias and reverse causality, through
appropriate fixed effects models and instrumental variables. Finally, few attempt to gauge the
relative contribution of the different mechanisms; the participation of women in society and politics,
or the culture that enables it.
We address these issues, of temporal scope, indicators, causality and mechanisms, by investigat-
ing the relationship between female political empowerment and conflict onset in a global analysis
spanning 1817-2015. To do this, we draw on female empowerment measures taken from the Va-
rieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman,
Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Krusell, Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova,
Olin, Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Petrarca, von Romer, Saxer, Seim, Sigman, Staton, Stepanova
and Wilson, 2017), which is recently extended back to the early 19th century as part of the Histori-
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cal V-DEM project (Knutsen et al., 2017). We combine this with historical intrastate conflict onset
data from UCDP/PRIO and Correlates of War, which allows us to study the historical relationship
between female empowerment and civil war. The fine-grained nature of the V-DEM data allows
us to offer a more disaggregated test of the link between female empowerment and civil conflict,
through a wide range of female empowerment aspects related to women’s civil liberties, political
participation and engagement in civil society.
Drawing on existing work, we outline two main mechanisms relating female empowerment to
civil peace. First, the participation-mechanism considers women as being more opposed to violence
and more sensitive to humanitarian concerns. Due to these dispositions, societies where women
influence decision-making through their participation in politics, should be less engaged in civil
war. Second, the norm-mechanism stipulates that the relationship between female empowerment
and civil conflict is not driven by women’s participation in politics per se, but by the particular
norms and culture that are prevalent in gender-equal societies. According to the participation-
mechanism, women’s participation matters even when we (hypothetically) hold culture constant,
while the norm-mechanism attributes effects to norms, irrespective of female participation. In
order to adjudicate between these two, we also draw on survey data from the World Values Survey
measuring gender-equal norms.
We start by investigating a macro-level index of female political empowerment and its relation-
ship to civil conflict. This uncovers a strong negative link between a country’s degree of female
empowerment and civil conflict. This obtains in appropriate fixed-effects specifications, and in
instrumental-variable models using different ancient agricultural history factors as instruments.
Using causal sensitivity analysis, we also show that the result is unlikely to reflect selection from
omitted variables. This set of tests offers the most comprehensive evidence to date that Female
Political Empowerment causes peace.
The uncovered relationship is stronger in the 20th century than in the 19th, which we think
reflects that women’s political participation did not increase markedly before this period. When
breaking female political empowerment down into constitutive concepts; women’s civil liberties,
women’s civil society participation and women’s political participation, we find a particularly strong
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relationship for political participation. We think this offers some evidence that including women
in positions of power yields the most positive peace dividend. Yet, since high level of female
representation in politics and society could again simply be a result of more female-friendly norms
– suggesting that it is culture rather than female involvement that is the driving force of peace –
we also run models where we control for survey items from World Values Survey capturing gender-
equal values (covering the 1981-2015 period). We find that the negative link between female political
empowerment and civil conflict holds also when controlling for gender-equal norms. At the same
time, gender-equal norms are negatively related to civil conflict when controlling for indicators of
female political empowerment. These findings offer new insights about the link between female
empowerment and peace, by suggesting that it is driven both by female participation in politics as
well as by cultural shifts towards gender equality.
2 State of the art: Gender-equality and armed conflict
In his work on the historical decline of (personal and organized) violence Pinker (2011) points to
“feminization” as one of the “better angels” that have led to a decline of violence, particularly in
the developed world. This feminization-thesis dovetails with much indirect evidence in favor of the
proposition that more gender equal cultures spawn less conflict. Individual-level studies show that
men are more likely to support using violence than women (Goldstein, 2001; Bjarneg˚ard, Broune´us
and Melander, 2017, 329–330). Others report a link between female gender and more positive
attitudes towards peace (than men) (Yablon, 2009; Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996), while there
are some indications that this is (at least partly) mediated through more gender-equal values and
attitudes (among women) (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). Moving from individuals to organizations
Asal et al. (2013) show that political organizations with gender-inclusive ideologies are less violent
(Asal et al., 2013). Furthermore, we observe that sexual violence against women and conflict very
often go hand in hand (Cohen and Nord˚as, 2014).
Do these micro- and meso-level relationships translate into aggregate patterns at the country
level? A handful of studies find that more gender-equal states are less belligerent at the international
level. For example, Caprioli (2000), who finds that more gender-equal societies are less likely to
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engage in disputes (see also Caprioli (2003), Caprioli and Boyer (2001) and Regan and Paskeviciute
(2003)).
The relationship between female empowerment and conflict within states is less studied. Some
investigate how family-structures that subordinate women relate to political violence. Hudson,
Bowen and Nielsen (2015) find that societies with patriarchal clan governance are more prone to
political violence (Bowen, Hudson and Nielsen, 2015). There is also some evidence that societies
practicing polygyny, a co-factor of misogyny, are less peaceful (Kanazawa, 2009). Gleditsch et al.
(2011) suggest that this is due to misogynous cultures rather than polygynous practices.
Melander (2005) investigates whether more gender-equal states are less prone to internal armed
conflict. He considers three proxies for gender-equality: 1) whether the leader is female, 2) the
percentage of women in parliament, and 3) the female-to-male higher education ratio. He finds
that more gender equal societies are less prone to internal conflict.1. Relatedly, Caprioli (2005)
finds that more gender equal societies – measured using fertility rates and women’s share of the
labor force - are less likely to experience civil wars (see also Gizelis (2009). A recent evaluation by
Schaftenaar (2017) considers non-violent conflict and violent conflict together in one analysis, and
finds that gender equality – measured by equality in education and fertility rates – yields a higher
likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset, compared to no conflict or armed conflict.
The studies noted above are pioneering contribution that all suggest a link between female
empowerment and peace. Yet, they leave several issues on the table. First, they draw on a
limited number of proxies for gender equality, focusing either on female politicians or socio-economic
indicators such as women in the labor force or fertility rates. This omits important aspects of
female empowerment, such as female mass participation in politics through suffrage or civil society
organizations, or the extent to which civil liberties apply to women. Female political empowerment
can be broken down into numerous aspects, that do not neatly overlap. For example, in India,
there is a high percentage of female members of parliament, but it scores notoriously low on gender
equality on other indicators such as civil society participation and female journalists. This calls for
exploring a wider range of indicators.
1For a similar study of human-rights abuses see Melander:2005JPR
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A second, and related issue, is the restricted temporal and cross-sectional scope of extant stud-
ies. Many countries do not report data on variables such as women in the labor force. This may lead
to selection bias, as the analyzed sample skews towards highly developed countries (Cueva Beteta,
2006). Most time-series of countries that do report data are quite short. For example, the data
used in Caprioli (2005) and Schaftenaar (2017) start in 1960. This omits several of the great ad-
vancements in female empowerment, related to e.g., voting rights and civil liberties. Third, existing
studies do not adequately account for threats from omitted variables and reverse causality. None
of the mentioned studies focus on country- and year-fixed effects models, meaning that there is a
high possibility for omitted variables at the country-level conditioning both gender-equal cultures
and conflict, and temporal trends that correlate the global evolution of civil conflict and gender
equality. Reverse causality is also a problem, since conflict (and conflict risk) affects female empow-
erment. Not accounting for these threats could lead to spurious results. Finally, few tests properly
distinguish between the two different mechanisms proposed in the literature, to adjudicate whether
it is female political empowerment per se that reduces violence, or the culture that enables it.
Answering the question of how female empowerment affects conflict also requires a consideration
of what causes female empowerment. We will not attempt an exhaustive review of the literature
on this question here, but briefly mention some key recent contributions that rely on cross-national
evidence (which is crucial in this paper). Some studies emphasize technological change, that enable
greater participation of women in the workplace (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016; Goldin, 2006), while
others emphasize more general features of the macro-economy that hold women back such as the
structure of the welfare state, countries’ position in the international division of labor (Iversen and
Rosenbluth, 2006, 2010), or natural resource dependence (Ross, 2008). Others emphasize cultural
factors such as religion (Bayanpourtehrani and Sylwester, 2013), or polygyny (McDermott et al.,
2018). A recent literature explores the impact of deep-rooted agricultural histories on country-level
differences in female empowerment. Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) argue that early plow use
favored a male-breadwinner model of agriculture that led to the subordination of women. Hansen,
Jensen and Skovsgaard (2015) find that having a long history of agriculture predicts less female
empowerment, since a transition to agriculture increased fertility and thus left women with less
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time to other activities than child rearing. These contributions all consider important sources of
female empowerment that we need to account for when attempting to estimate its relationship with
civil conflict.
3 Mechanisms linking female empowerment and conflict
Explanations for why gender-equality should dispose for peace usually center on two types of
mechanisms. The first relates to how female participation in society may promote peace, and the
second to how a gender-equal culture (that also promotes participation) is conducive to peace.
While these two aspects may be hard to tease apart empirically, they are different in important
ways, as will be discussed below.
3.1 Female participation
First, female participation in decision-making, politics and civil society may be associated with less
armed conflict due to women being less condoning of the use of violence than men. This does not
rely on the crude notion that women are not involved in violent politics at all. A large literature
shows that they do, in various ways (see e.g., McDermott, 2015; Wood and Thomas, 2017; Goldstein,
2001; Alison, 2009). However, while this goes to show that women also engage in violence, there
is evidence that they on average are relatively less disposed than men to favor violence (Yablon,
2009; Wilcox, Hewitt and Allsop, 1996; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003). Women are also found to
less often resort to direct interpersonal violence (e.g. Lagerspetz, Bjo¨rkqvist and Peltonen, 1988).
More generally, women are considered to be less willing to engage in power struggles for personal
gains or honor and more eager to “minimize power differences, share resources, and treat others
equally” (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Such attitudes should, on average, translate into a more
peaceful approach to political affairs.
Women’s supposed nonviolent dispositions have been traced to evolved “natural” aversions (to
violence) (Buss and Shackelford, 1997), as well as to the social construction of gender roles whereby
females adopt more peaceable attitudes, while male – or “macho” – gender roles reward violence and
violence-promoting behavior. The construction of violent masculine gender norms is described in
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the concept of “military masculinities” (Bjarneg˚ard and Melander, 2011). A related argument that
also relies on nurture assumptions holds that women are more sensitive to humanitarian concerns
due to the fact that they (and children) are usually the worst affected by some consequences of
political instability, such as humanitarian crisis, poverty, and sexual violence (Shea and Christian,
2016).
On these accounts, what matters is the representation of women such that their natural and/or
socially constructed aversions to violence will have a greater impact on policy. For example, demo-
cratic societies in which half of the electorate are female, should by implication favor more peaceful
tactics for dealing with dissident groups, and thus become less often embroiled in civil wars. Hence,
this mechanism implies that a high level of female participation, for instance in the parliament, gov-
ernment, the electorate or civil society, will influence the likelihood of political violence.
3.2 Gender-equality norms
Rather than looking to intrinsic (or learned) differences between men and women, the second
mechanism pertains to the norms of highly gender-equal societies. According to this reasoning,
societies where women are subordinate rely on principles of domination, honor and control in the
family. These principles are easily transferred from the family into other domains such as behavior
towards minorities, political opponents or groups competing for resources, and they may serve as a
rationale for the use of political violence. Conversely, in societies where gender equality prevails, the
mutual respect and tolerance that characterize family ties creates a culture emphasizing peaceful
social relations and decision-making.
This mechanism assumes that “female-friendly” norms, among both men and women, are linked
to peaceful behavior. Recent studies, such as Bjarneg˚ard, Broune´us and Melander (2017) offer
evidence in accordance with this perspective, showing that individuals espousing patriarchal values
- both men and women - have more favorable views towards using violence.
One interpretation of this mechanism is that gender-equal norms influence attitudes towards
and willingness to use violence. The other interpretation is that concerns for gender equality is one
component in a broader culture also embracing attitudes such as anti-violence, tolerance, trust and
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democratic decision-making (see, e.g. Inglehart and Welzel, 2006). On the latter account, gender-
equal norms do not explain willingness to use violence - rather, they are both part of the same
normative framework.
According to the norm-argument, the socialization away from traditional masculine cultures
makes the average person, also males, less likely to condone violence. When the population as
such becomes more violence-averse as a result of more gender-equal norms, it does not matter that
women, specifically, be represented, simply that those affecting policy - men and women - have
become more averse to violence as a means.
3.3 Expectations
Both mechanisms discussed above yield the expectation that societies where women are empowered
should be more peaceful. This is the main hypothesis. Although the two mechanisms are clearly
distinct as to what the driving force of the link between female empowerment and violence rela-
tionship is, they are hard to disentangle empirically. High levels of female participation in politics
or civil society, for instance through representation in the state legislature or in local councils,
could very well be a product of norms: Societies with a female-friendly culture should have lower
informal and cultural barriers for women wanting to enter politics. This makes it more likely that
voters will elect female representatives. This is a problem for existing studies arguing that female
political representation – specifically – is a driving force for peace, as a high level of women in
politics could be driven by gender-equal norms. Conversely, female empowerment norms may be
influenced by female participation, as experience with women in politics may increase acceptance
for female political participation and reduce misogynist attitudes.
We address this issue, by investigating whether formal manifestations of female empowerment
such as political participation and women’s civil liberties influence civil conflict when controlling
for female empowerment norms, and vice versa.
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4 Research design
This study focuses on female political empowerment, relying on the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge
et al., 2011). Female political empowerment is defined Sundstro¨m et al. (2015) as “a process
of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal
decision-making.” (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Andersson, Bernhard,
Fish, Glynn et al., 2017; Sundstro¨m et al., 2015). For maximum temporal scope, we draw data
from both the contemporary version, spanning 1900-2015 (Coppedge et al. 2017) and the Historical
V-Dem dataset (Knutsen et al., 2017), covering 1789-1900. These two datasets comprise a range
of concrete items and higher-level indices relating to female political empowerment. As our bench-
mark, we consider the Female Political Empowerment (FPE) index, embedded in contemporary
V-dem and presented in Sundstro¨m et al. (2015).
The FPE index in the original V-DEM dataset averages the scores of three sub-indices. The
fist building block; the women’s civil liberties index, is formed by taking the point estimate from
a Bayesian factor analysis model including three concrete items; freedom of domestic movement
for women, freedom from forced labor for women, women’s right to private property and access to
justice.2 The second component is the women’s civil society participation index. This is a latent
factor variable estimated on the following items; freedom of discussion for women, womens civil
society organization (CSO) participation, and share of female journalists. The final component is
the women’s political participation, which averages the indicators of share of female legislators, and
political power distributed by gender. For more detailed description, see Coppedge et al. (2017).
The FPE index as constructed in the original V-DEM dataset is not included in the Historical V-
Dem (HV-Dem) dataset. This reflects the exclusion of the sub-index women’s political participation
in HV-Dem. To construct a measure that spans 1789-2015, we create our own historical FPE index,
by averaging the Women’s civil society participation index and the Women’s civil liberties index,
both of which are included in Historical V-DEM. When we run analyses for the entire 1789-2015
period, we will use this Historical FPE index, but resort to the original FPE index when we restrict
the sample to the 1900-2015 period.
2The details of the latent trait model are described in Pemstein et al. (2018).
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The evolution of female political empowerment as captured by the historical and contemporary
versions of the FPE index is presented in figures 1 and 2, showing the average score on the FPE
index globally (1900-2015), as well as the Historical FPE index (1789-1900). The figures shows a
steadily increasing trend towards greater female political empowerment. The measure in Figure 1
includes political participation, which might explain the stark increases after WWII.
Figure 1: Global average of the V-DEM Female Political Empowerment index (1900-2015)
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As our key outcome, we look at civil conflict onset, using two different sources. For the period
1946-2015, we rely on the UCDP/PRIO database (Gleditsch et al., 2002), the 2016 version (Me-
lander, Pettersson and Themne´r, 2016). Here, we opt for the most inclusive civil conflict category,
using the 25 battle death threshold. Since we also want to study the pre-WWII period, we extend
our civil conflict variable back in time using the Correlates of War data on intrastate wars (Sarkees
and Wayman, 2010), covering the 1817-2007 period. This applies a different battle-death threshold
(of 1000 deaths) than UCDP/PRIO, but we think this is less problematic than it appears: Since
the UCDP/PRIO coding procedure is very conservative (ie. it needs verification from several in-
dependent sources for each battle-death), and the Correlates of War data is not as conservative,
we believe these two sources are less discrepant they appear. We combine these two sources into a
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Figure 2: Global average of the Historical V-DEM Female Political Empowerment index (1789-1900
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conflict variable spanning the period 1817-2015, registering COW conflicts until 1945, and UCDP
conflicts after 1945. To assuage fears that our results are driven by the construction of this conflict
variable, we analyze the different periods covered by COW and UCDP separately in additional
tests.
Our baseline models investigate conflict onset specifically, and censor all conflict years that are
not years of conflict onset. We estimate a standard civil-conflict onset logit model, that accounts
for temporal dependence using linear, cubed and squared peace-year terms. In addition to this,
we add controls to our baseline model using extant studies of the origins of female empowerment
to guide our choice of confounders. To capture technological change, and general income level, we
include log of GDP p.c., and log of population. We also include democracy and democracy squared
(measured using the Polyarchy index from V-Dem) to account for the fact that female empowerment
could reflect the general level of democracy. To capture the global diffusion of female empowerment
norms, as well as the waxing and waning of civil conflict over time, we include year-fixed effects.
These capture global secular trends in female empowerment and civil conflict. Since many of the
theories of the origins of gender equality highlight deep-rooted cultural and historical factors, we
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also include country-fixed effects. These will pick up factors such as agricultural history and culture.
In additional tests we include other confounders to investigate sensitivity.
5 Results
First, we probe whether there is a general link between female empowerment and conflict from
1817 until today, and in which time-periods this is most evident. The first two columns of table 1
consider the association between the (historical) FPE index and the log odds of conflict onset.
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Column 1.1 displays a parsimonious model with only peace-year terms, year- and region-fixed
effects. This model includes the most observations by far (N=16566), which is the “effective
N” without observations in years with no conflict onset. In this model, the FPE coefficient is
in the expected direction (β =-0.956) and precisely estimated (Z-score=-3.46). This indicates
that countries with higher levels of female political empowerment have lower conflict risk ceteris
paribus. Column 1.2 introduces country-fixed effects, and is much more demanding, as it drops
all time-invariant information that is country-specific. In this model, FPE is similar and negative
(β =-1.177), while slightly less precise (Z-score−2.76). This indicates that most of the correlation
between female empowerment (when using the historical measure) and conflict is attributable to
between-country variation.
However, important societal developments such as income growth, and democracy, can affect
both the evolution of FPE and conflict. Column 1.3 enters GDP, population and the democracy
terms into the baseline model as covariates (with no country-fixed effects). In this model, the sample
is somewhat reduced (due to missing values for the covariates), to 12988. Yet, the coefficient
is negative and similar to the coefficient in model 1.1 (β =-1.493, Z-score=-3.99). Model 1.4
includes country-fixed effects. In this model, the coefficient is greatly reduced when contrasting
with column 1.3, and is no longer statistically significant. Model 1.5 includes country-random
intercepts, yielding a negative and precisely estimated coefficient. This patterns suggests that
the relationship between the historical measure of FPE and conflict risk is mostly due to stable
between-country differences, when considering the entire 1817-2015 period and using the historical
FPE index (with no participation component).
One reason why the estimates weaken with country-fixed effects, while retained in e.g., random
intercept models, could be little variation over time. This will be especially true in the 1817-1900
period, where there were few reforms that altered the empowerment of women (such as women’s
right to vote), and also when using a measure that does not include participation. To see if results
differ for the contemporary female empowerment index which covers the period from 1900 onward
and includes political participation, we run similar analyzes as in 1.1-1.4 using the contemporary
FPE index and studying the 1900-2015 period. We expect to find stronger relationships for this pe-
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riod, in particular because this is when female political participation took off, initially in European
countries and then spreading to other parts of the globe. We also expect the inclusion of female
political participation to strengthen the FPE-conflict link. Columns 1.6-1.7 consider the association
between conflict risk and the FPE index after 1900. These models display a quite strong negative
link between FPE and conflict onset, also strongly evident in the conservative model including both
year- and country fixed effects (1.7).
Finally, we look at only the 1946-2015 period. We zoom in on this period since most of our
additional controls in further robustness tests are restricted to it, and because it is covered by the
UCDP measure of conflict, which is arguably considered a gold standard. These models (1.8-1.9)
show a strong link between FPE and conflict risk.
Is the FPE-conflict link of substantive importance? A simulation of model 1.3 indicates that
when holding all other variables at their mean, and increasing a country’s FPE index from its
minimum to maximum value, annual conflict risk drops from roughly 30% to around 5%. This
means that conflict risk is almost five times higher in maximally patriarchal countries than in
highly gender-egalitarian countries, when other factors (such as GDP) are held at their mean
values. This relationship is displayed in figure 3, which shows simulated probabilities of conflict
onset, as FPE moves from its minimum to its maximum value, with covariates held at means.
Table 2 dis-aggregates the different sub-components of the FPE index. It distinguishes between
the three sub-indices; female civil liberties (column 2.1), female civil society participation (column
2.2), and female political participation (column 2.3). Column 2.4 includes all three in the same
model. If the results in table 1 indicate that political participation, specifically, matters a lot, then
this is further corroborated by the results in table 2. It shows that female political participation
is most strongly linked to the outcome of civil conflict risk, and especially so when we control for
the other two dimensions. It is negative and precisely estimated when entered in isolation, and
similarly so when entered along with the two other indicators of FPE. While this provides some
suggestion that political participation is primary, it is also quite hard to interpret the effect of
participation when controlling for e.g., civil liberties or civil society partipation. These factors are
causally intertwined, and an increase in one will often lead to, or result from, an increase in another.
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Table 2: Logit models of conflict onset looking at sub-components of the female empowerment
index, 1900-2015
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Time period: (1900-2015)
Outcome: Conflict onset t+ 1 (UCDP/COW)
Female civil liberties -0.897* -0.703
(-2.32) (-1.41)
Female civil society participation -1.323** -0.786
(-3.13) (-1.46)
Female political participation -1.573*** -1.289**
(-3.54) (-2.79)
Democracy 6.000*** 6.154*** 4.777*** 6.571***
(4.35) (4.50) (3.67) (4.29)
Democracy2 -6.916*** -6.997*** -5.960*** -7.064***
(-4.33) (-4.38) (-3.85) (-4.33)
GDP p.c. -0.440*** -0.432*** -0.338** -0.287**
(-4.92) (-4.87) (-3.21) (-2.65)
L(population) 0.389*** 0.405*** 0.387*** 0.373***
(6.93) (6.99) (7.16) (7.00)
Peaceyears -0.0803*** -0.0795*** -0.0758*** -0.0738***
(-8.24) (-8.39) (-6.32) (-6.37)
Peaceyears2 0.000976*** 0.000965*** 0.000967*** 0.000925***
(6.12) (6.20) (4.86) (4.82)
Peaceyears3 -0.00000314*** -0.00000309*** -0.00000329*** -0.00000308***
(-4.76) (-4.82) (-3.93) (-3.79)
N 12748 12762 9297 9288
Region-FE X X X X
Year-FE X X X X
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Z statistics in parentheses. Country-clustered SE’s. Intercept omitted from
table.
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Figure 3: Simulated probability of conflict onset as FPE index increases
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In sum, tables 1 and 2 paint an interesting picture: FPE seems strongly and negatively linked to
conflict onset, at least in the 20th century. We also find some evidence that this is particularly due
to political participation, which did not significantly increase until expansions of female suffrage in
the 20th century.
While the stronger results for participation provide some guidance, the results so far do not
clearly indicate whether the identified link between female empowerment and armed conflict is due
to women being more involved in political institutions, or whether it rather reflects the culture and
prevailing norms in societies where women participate in politics. To investigate this, we draw on
indicators of “gender-equal” norms from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2014)
(WVS). Specifically, we use two items asking respondents whether they agree with: 1) “When
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”, 2) “On the whole, men make
better political leaders than women do”. These two survey items are combined into one indicator
19
– Female Empowerment Values. Positive values represent more gender-equal responses. One im-
portant challenge with the data from World Values Survey is the large number of missing values,
particularly in the time-series. WVS currently only contains 6 survey rounds, spanning the 1980-
2015 period, which means that countries have a maximum of 5 observations over time, and many
have considerably less. To avoid sample-selection bias emerging from listwise deletion we conduct
multiple imputation using Amelia II Honaker, King and Blackwell (2011). This has proven fruitful
for the WVS data in particular (Dahlum and Knutsen, 2017). The imputation accounts for the
time-series cross-sectional structure of the data, and produces a total of 5 different datasets. In the
following, we present estimations based on the average values across the 5 imputed datasets. Since
our imputation is limited by the start- and end-points of the WVS, the time series of each imputed
dataset is 1980-2015.
In table 3, the combined indicator of Female Empowerment Values is added to models inves-
tigating the link between the aggregate FPE index and civil war. In models 3.1-3.2, we replicate
models 1.7 and 1.8, now using the imputed dataset (with the restricted post-1980 sample). The
results still indicate a negative association between FPE and civil conflict, also when including
country fixed effects (although the Z-score is significantly weakened). When controlling for gender-
equal values in models 3.3 and 3.4, the coefficient estimates for FPE decreases substantially in size.
This is consistent with the notion that a female-friendly culture promotes women’s political empow-
erment, while also reducing the risk of civil conflict. But, interestingly, there is still some evidence
that the female empowerment index is negatively related to civil conflict. The coefficient is still
negative and significant in the model with region-FE’s. To be sure, the Z-score is reduced in model
3.4, which includes country FE’s and control for values, but the coefficient and standard errors
remain stable enough that we suspect to find a negative and more precisely estimated coefficient in
a longer time-series. This indicates that, while a substantial share of the relationship between FPE
and civil conflict is related to societal norms, there is also some evidence of an independent link
running from women’s participation in politics to peace. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimate for
gender-equal norms is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels in both models 3
and 4, suggesting that such norms are strongly conducive to peace when controlling for indicators
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of female political participation.
Table 3: Logit models of conflict onset, 1981-2015
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4)
Time period (1980-2015)
Outcome: Conflict onset t+ 1 (UCDP)
Female empowerment values -2.417∗∗ -2.308∗∗
(-2.66) (-2.84)
FPE -3.649∗∗∗ -4.067∗ -2.419∗ -2.782
(-3.79) (-2.07) (-2.24) (-1.38)
L(population) 0.287∗∗∗ 0.420∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.426∗
(3.71) (1.97) (3.48) (2.00)
GDP p.c. -0.130 -0.455 -0.0160 -0.355
(-0.62) (-1.25) (-0.08) (-0.97)
Democracy 7.164∗∗ 1.318 7.408∗∗ 1.757
(2.64) (1.25) (2.75) (1.64)
Democracy2 -6.923∗ -6.123∗ -6.727∗ -5.727
(-2.27) (-2.10) (-2.21) (-1.71)
Peaceyears -0.183∗∗∗ 0.0651 -0.192∗∗∗ 0.0666
(-3.46) (1.07) (-3.59) (1.09)
Peaceyears2 0.00603∗ -0.00548 0.00643∗∗ -0.00557
(2.55) (-1.86) (2.70) (-1.90)
Peaceyears3 -0.0000579∗ 0.000105∗∗ -0.0000616∗ 0.000107∗∗
(-2.06) (2.70) (-2.19) (2.77)
N 2938 1839 2938 1839
Country-FE X X
Region-FE X X
Year-FE X X X X
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered on countries.
Intercept omitted from table. Years of conflict incidence that are not years of onset are censored.
5.1 Reverse causality and omitted variables
While the associations uncovered above are quite strong and consistent with expectations, they
could potentially reflect different forms of bias. Crucially, it is often claimed that it is conflict –
latent or manifest – that conduces female empowerment, and not the other way around. The most
popular version of this argument holds that civil conflicts create opportunities for female empow-
erment during and after the war has ended. Two key mechanisms have been proposed. First, wars
open up new spaces for women to partake in the economy and society more generally, as men are
disproportionately involved in fighting. The increased participation of women lingers on after the
conflict, leading to greater female empowerment post-conflict (Tripp, 2015). Second, women are of-
ten active in peace movements, and are either informally or formally involved in peace negotiations.
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This spills over into a higher level of women’s inclusion in post-war politics. Women’s rights issues
are consequently often included in post-war constitutions, promoting female empowerment agendas.
In line with these arguments, studies indicate that female political empowerment increases after
conflict, with a particular emphasis on Africa (see e.g., Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Hughes, 2009).
Could this relationship bias our results? Since we control for time since the last conflict, this
is less of a concern. However, relationships can be much more subtle. For example, if the female
empowerment trend starts during a conflictual period, but right before it reaches the battle death
threshold, then it is really the conflict that is driving Female Empowerment and not vice versa.
To investigate this, we run models regressing conflict onset on future changes in the FPE index (5,
8 and 10 years). If there is a pre-treatment trend whereby conflict is the driver of empowerment,
we should see that future female empowerment is linked to current conflict. These models can be
seen in table A1 in the appendix. We find no indication that future changes in the FPE index
are associated with (current) conflict onset. To probe whether female empowerment increases after
a conflict ends, which is interesting in and of itself, and would support the findings by, Hughes
and Tripp (e.g., 2015) (see also Hughes, 2009), we regress the FPE index on indicators registering
the time since a conflict has ended (we use 2, 5 and 10 year lags). In contrast to the literature
suggesting a positive relationship between a recent conflict occurrence and female empowerment,
we find (shown in table A2 in the appendix) the opposite: Having had a conflict that ended in the
recent past is associated with decreases in female empowerment. This relationship holds when we
measure a conflict ending in the past 3, 5 and 10 years.
An additional threat to our result is the potential for one or more omitted variables that
condition both female political empowerment and conflict risk. A clear example of this would be
if women’s involvement in peace movements to pre-empt conflicts increases female empowerment
more generally, while at the same time being a response to latent conflict risk. Another example
would be if female political empowerment resulted from changes in popular attitudes in a more
liberal direction that could also spur aversion to political violence. It could also be that a culture
of political violence drives female political empowerment: In conflict-prone societies, attributes
associated with proficiency in violence will be valued more (for example by voters) and this could
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create a more male-dominated politics.
One way to get around this thorny problem is to attempt Instrumental Variables (IV) analysis,
to endogenize the female empowerment index. We pursue this, drawing on the findings of Alesina,
Giuliano and Nunn (2013) that historical plow use - when conditioning on other historical features
- predicts contemporary female subordination. We adopt Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013)’s data
structure, and consider the mean of the female empowerment index as our main predictor, and the
mean of our conflict variable as our main outcome (over the 1900-2015 period). We then produce a
first-stage by regressing FPE on our baseline covariates (taking their means over the whole period),
the plow variable, and the baseline historical covariates from Alesina and Guliano, in a sample
of 160 countries. In this analysis, the plow instrument shows the expected relationship to female
empowerment, but we do not gain enough statistical power in the first stage to convincingly estimate
the effect of female empowerment in the second stage (F= 3.34). We note that the coefficient in
the second stage is negative (as expected) but lacks statistical power. From this baseline, we try
to strengthen our instrument by including another proxy for historical agriculture, highlighted by
Hansen, Jensen and Skovsgaard (2015), namely the suitability for agriculture, taken from Alesina
and Guliano. This does improve our first-stage somewhat (F=6.72) and increases the T-value for
the second stage coefficient (-1.95). We go on to use two additional instruments, namely whether
the ancestral culture of the given country – as defined and operationalized in Alesina and Guliano
– practiced matrilocal or patrilocal post-marital rules, which is also proposed as a determinant of
female empowerment (Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013). These instruments umdo not improve
the first stage, while the coefficient remains similar to model 3.
One problem with the setup above is the democracy variable (Polyarchy from V-DEM), which
is constructed partly based on women’s political participation (e.g., female suffrage etc.). This
means that the first stage will instrument for FPE net of democracy and thus many of the crucial
components of women’s political empowerment. On the other hand, not controlling for Polyarchy
risks a violation of the exclusion restriction, since the instruments can influence civil war through
the excluded democracy index. To gauge how the inclusion of Polyarchy affects our 2SLS results,
we run the 2SLS models without democracy, in model 5. This significantly improves the first stage
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Table 4: 2SLS models of conflict history, 1900-2015
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5)
Model: % 2SLS
Outcome: % of years in conflict
FPE -1.500 -1.284* -0.995* -0.980* -0.613**
(-1.14) (-2.29) (-2.21) (-2.34) (-2.63)
Alesina and Guliano controls
Agricultural suitability 0.027
(0.19)
Large animals 0.062 0.073 0.090 0.091 0.043
(0.53) (0.69) (0.90) (0.90) (0.41)
Tropical climate -0.040 -0.023 0.007 0.009 -0.004
(-0.36) (-0.38) (0.14) (0.17) (-0.08)
Economic complexity 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.007
(0.36) (0.33) (0.10) (0.09) (0.55)
Political hierarchies 0.028 0.025 0.018 0.018 0.004
(1.11) (1.19) (0.92) (0.92) (0.26)
Additional controls
Democracy 0.808 0.700* 0.540+ 0.532*
(1.15) (2.00) (1.91) (2.03)
L(population) 0.046** 0.048** 0.050** 0.050** 0.057**
(3.28) (4.97) (5.37) (5.51) (6.11)
L(GDP pc) -0.043* -0.043* -0.038* -0.038* 0.002
(-2.18) (-2.28) (-2.26) (-2.22) (0.07)
Instrument Plow Plow,agriculture plow,agriculture plow,agriculture plow,agriculture
matrilocality matrilocality,patrilocality
First-stage F value 3.34 6.72 4.71 3.83 19.27
N 166 166 166 166 166
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. T statistics in parentheses. Intercept omitted from table.The
outcome registers the share of years with civil conflict in a country throughout the period 1900-2015.
(F=19), which is highly expected since the variance in female empowerment should be greater when
it is not purged of the covariance with democracy. It also greatly strengthens the precision of the
second stage coefficient, which is still negatively signed (to T=-2.63). This indicates an effect of
the FPE index when we do not condition on democracy, although it can not be ruled out that this
is driven by democracy.
The exclusion restriction embedded in these 2SLS models is that agriculture and plow use does
not impact civil conflict through other channels than female empowerment, when we condition on
the covariates. A significant threat to this arises when considering the impact of early agricultural
history on state-formation and subsequent state capacity. It is widely held that states with agricul-
tural “head starts” developed states earlier, leading to subsequently higher level of wealth and state
capacity in the contemporary era (Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman, 2002; Putterman, 2008).
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However, we do control for a range of factors that should correlate strongly with this historical
process, such as presence of historical states (political hierarchies), and present-day GDP. While
we think these can assuage concerns regarding the exclusion restrictions, this is not a definitive
safeguard. In summary, while far from conclusive evidence, we think these IV results, with all the
above discussed caveats, strengthen a causal interpretation of the FPE-conflict relationship, and
provide some additional layers of evidence that we can attribute an effect of female empowerment
on civil conflict.
As noted above, the IV analysis is no panacea. To further address endogeneity issues, we
therefore proceed to evaluate how sensitive our results are to selection on observables, using this
assessment as a guide to (potential) selection from the unobservables (Altonji, Elder and Taber,
2005; Blackwell, 2013). This starts from the premise of proportional selection, namely that the bias
stemming from included covariates can inform us about the threat from omitted variables. This
assumption is particularly warranted when the covariates are selected for their ability to predict
conflict (and their strong relationship to female political empowerment). The bias generated by
these selected controls, when they are left out, should inform us about the bias stemming from
other unmeasured factors. To do this, we first estimate a restricted model, R, that only includes
the FPE index, and register the coefficient βR. Subsequently, we estimate models using different
control sets, C, and register the coefficients βC . Then we calculate the selection from observables:
βC
βC−βR . The result, often referred to as AET-stats (after Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005)), tells
us how much bigger the estimated (controlled) coefficient is than the selection bias stemming from
observable covariates.
Table 5 presents AET stats from different control sets. The first set includes the baseline con-
trols. The second set adds several democracy-indices from the V-Dem dataset. These are included
to tap various democracy concepts (such as liberal democracy, and egalitarian democracy) that
are correlated with the FPE index but are not exhausted by controlling for electoral democracy.
If their omission greatly biases the FPE result, then we would expect the coefficient to be pulled
towards zero when they are included. The second set of controls include several demographic vari-
ables that could bias the link between FPE and conflict, specifically fertility rates, infant mortality
25
Table 5: Selection from observables as a guide to the unobservables
Controls in the full set βCβC−βR Sign of bias from observables
Baseline controls -2.85 positive
Baseline + Egalitarian-, deliberative-, participatory- and liberal democracy indices -2 positive
Baseline + Fertility rate, infant mortality, urbanization -2.85 positive
Baseline + Growth, education, income inequality -2.18 positive
Baseline + All controls -2 positive
and urbanization. The next set includes additional economic variables that could potentially be
omitted confounders: Economic growth, education levels, and income inequality, while the final set
includes all controls. All variables aretaken from the V-Dem dataset.
As table 4 shows, the AET stats for all control sets range from about 2 to 2.8. This suggests
that the selection-from-unobservables must be at least double that of selection from observables
to make the estimate zero. While this performance is only moderately strong (compare with
e.g. Nunn, 2008), another fact makes us increasingly confident in the robustness of our result to
selection-from-unobservables: namely, that all the observable controls (when excluded) pull the
coefficient towards zero, inducing a bias that pulls in the direction of a null-finding. Hence, when
we include controls that are highly plausible confounders (relating to institutional characteristics,
socio-economic development and demographics) the coefficient becomes more strongly negative.
This suggests that the relationship is probably stronger than what our models currently indicate:
If we had continued to add covariates, assuming they behave similarly to our included confounders,
our expectation is that the relationship would become more strongly negative.
In addition to these tests, we perform a range of additional robustness tests, included in the
appendix, such as e.g., running Generalized Additive Models to evaluate the functional form of
the relationship, changing the estimator, using different lag-lengths etc.. In brief, all of these tests
retain the negative relationship between FPE and conflict risk. Crucially, we also evaluate how
much the FPE index improves the performance of our baseline model when it comes to predicting
civil conflict (Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010, see e.g.,). We perform both in- and out-of-sample
evaluations of this question, finding that female political empowerment substantially improves
predictive performance, both in- and out-of-sample (see appendix, A9).
26
6 Conclusion
Female political empowerment has greatly increased over the course of the 20th century. This
paper offers the first comprehensive global test with data from two centuries probing the relation-
ship between female political empowerment and conflict. Drawing on two versions of the female
empowerment index from V-DEM and Historical V-DEM, we offer a much more thorough test of
this relationship than extant literature, with better temporal coverage, the ability to deal with time
trends and country-specific omitted factors as well the potential to assess what mechanisms are at
play. We also estimate instrumental-variable models, and conduct causal sensitivity tests to gauge
the threat to a causal interpretation of this finding. These empirical tests yield solid evidence that
societies where women are highly empowered are less likely to experience civil conflict. Exploring
the 1817-2015 period, we find that this relationship is strongest in the 20th century, and particularly
so post WWII. We believe this is due to the fact that female political participation increased most
markedly in this period. Consistent with this, we find that the political participation component
of the FPE index is the one that is most strongest linked to conflict.
Another important insight gained from our empirical investigation is that the uncovered rela-
tionship seems due to both female empowerment in the form of women’s participation in politics
and due to female-friendly norms reducing willingness to use violence. Indeed, this paper is the first
to systematically document that gender-equal values are associated with less civil conflict, and that
this holds even when controlling for formal civil liberties and women’s political representation. Our
findings also inform the general civil war literature by suggesting an important “cultural” correlate
of war – the extent to which societies tolerate and respect women. The findings suggest that the
benefits of bringing women into politics and civil society reach far beyond goals of gender equality,
through a negative effect on political violence.
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A Appendix
This appendix includes the following. Section A.1 displays summary statistics for the key variables
included in the empirical analyses. Section A.2 analyses whether future female empowerment affects
current conflict, which would indicate a pre-trend in the relationship between female empowerment
and conflict that would yield bias. It also looks at the relationship between the end of a conflict (2,
5 and 10 years ago) affects future levels of FPE, which is assumed in the arguments claiming that
historical conflict increases female empowerment. Section A.3 investigates the sensitivity of the
baseline results to different lag-lengths, while section A.4 investigates the relationship between the
disaggregated individual female empowerment items that make up the FPE index, from V-DEM,
and conflict. Section A.5 probes sensitivity to different functional form assumptions (than the
logit models) by running OLS, while section A.6 estimates Generalized Additive Models, to probe
whether the relationship between FPE and conflict displays non-linearities. Section A.7 shows the
models used in the causal sensitivity analysis, while section A.8 shows the first-stage models for
the IV analysis. Finally, section A.9 performs a predictive evaluation of the improvements in (in-
and out-of-sample perfomance) of the FPE index.
i
A.1 Summary statistics
Table A.1: Descriptives for variables in the baseline TSCS models
(1)
count mean sd min max
FPE 14080 .50184 .2400019 .0360516 .968036
Historical FPE 25653 -.0044776 .3710141 -.5614409 1
Conflict onset 25253 .0158397 .1248576 0 1
Womens civil liberties 25346 .4281817 .2944714 .0008733 .9845681
Womens civil society participation 25091 .3640379 .2735255 .0125522 .9714019
Womens political participation 14109 .4546333 .2972993 .0369743 .9999575
Democracy 24168 .2638206 .2615567 .0080664 .9534524
Female legislators 12782 7.721595 9.981451 0 63.8
Female journalists 18159 19.53367 14.26258 0 70.375
Freedom of movement 25667 -.1841115 1.460462 -4.643585 3.204577
Freedom from forced labor 25514 -.0671767 1.587775 -3.938172 3.019982
Womens CSO participation 25048 -.4560889 1.492281 -3.55229 3.266965
Womens property rights 25517 -.1581533 1.476474 -3.719711 2.973385
Womens access to justice 25506 -.17182 1.478007 -3.717892 3.865908
Freedom of discussion 25667 -.3206236 1.50504 -3.559445 3.576789
Power distributed by gender 25468 -.7867669 1.378916 -2.84582 3.844923
GDP p.c. 20575 7.614497 1.060956 4.652566 11.36099
L(population) 20575 8.465405 1.624161 3.332772 14.04084
ii
A.2 Pre-trends and effects of conflict on female empowerment
Table A.2 shows the estimated coefficient for future FPE and conflict onset, where we lead the FPE
variable with 2-, 5- and 10 years. If this produces significant results, this could indicate that there
is a common trend in the two variables that does not reflect a causal relationship between FPE
and conflict. This is done in models A1-A3. These show no relationship between leaded levels of
FPE and conflict onset.
The second set of models, A4-A6, study whether having had a recently ended conflict increases
Female Empowerment, as some studies claim (e.g., Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Hughes, 2009). These
models, regressing FPE on conflict that ended 2-, 5- and 10 years ago, indicate no such positive
relationship.
Table A.2: Pre-trends and effects of conflict on female empowerment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS
Outcome: Conflict onset t+ 1 Outcome: FPE t+ 1
FPEt+5 -1.550
(-1.31)
FPEt+8 -0.267
(-0.23)
FPEt+10 -0.651
(-0.57)
Conflict endedt−10 -0.0104***
(-3.49)
Conflict endedt−5 -0.0140***
(-4.74)
Conflict endedt−3 -0.0121***
(-3.63)
GDP p.c. -0.939** -0.793* -1.234*** -0.00202 -0.00178 -0.00194
(-3.09) (-2.52) (-3.73) (-0.77) (-0.68) (-0.74)
L(population) -0.115 -0.208* -0.231* -0.000931 -0.000939 -0.00100
(-1.33) (-2.35) (-2.56) (-1.29) (-1.31) (-1.40)
Democracy 6.749*** 6.611*** 6.986*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.224***
(3.65) (3.48) (3.70) (13.34) (13.34) (13.30)
Democracy2 -7.247*** -7.408*** -7.874*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(-3.51) (-3.55) (-3.75) (7.63) (7.64) (7.66)
Peaceyears -0.0258 -0.0310* -0.0339* -0.000298* -0.000257* -0.000114
(-1.67) (-2.00) (-2.20) (-2.02) (-2.03) (-0.97)
Peaceyears2 0.000479 0.000559* 0.000647* 0.00000252 0.00000222 0.000000773
(1.80) (2.09) (2.41) (1.43) (1.38) (0.50)
Peaceyears3 -0.00000159 -0.00000190 -0.00000228* -9.75e-09 -9.08e-09 -4.90e-09
(-1.40) (-1.65) (-1.98) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-0.93)
N 5046 4999 4929 7533 7533 7533
country-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
year-FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
t statistics (OLS) and Z scores (logit) in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
iii
A.3 Different lag lengths
Table A.3 estimates the baseline models with different lag-lengths, looking at lags of 2, 5 and 10
years, respectively. This table indicates a strong negative relationship, irrespective of the lag-length
chosen.
Table A.3: Varying the lag-lengths
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6)
Outcome: Civil conflict onset t+ 1 (COW and UCDP)
Period: 1817-2013 1900-2013
Lag length (years): 2 5 10 2 3 10
FPE -1.515*** -1.544*** -1.489*** -3.024*** -2.577*** -2.823***
(-4.26) (-3.97) (-3.65) (-3.21) (-3.16) (-2.82)
GDP p.c. -0.365*** -0.408*** -0.450*** -0.203 -0.257* -0.279
(-3.77) (-3.76) (-3.88) (-1.82) (-2.03) (-1.93)
L(population) 0.419*** 0.442*** 0.436*** 0.402*** 0.426*** 0.404***
(7.48) (7.09) (6.51) (7.23) (6.81) (5.68)
Democracy 6.780*** 6.566*** 5.628*** 7.489*** 6.343*** 6.999***
(4.32) (4.18) (3.55) (5.07) (3.98) (3.92)
Democracy2 -7.629*** -7.639*** -6.822*** -8.438*** -7.689*** -8.569***
(-4.10) (-4.13) (-3.89) (-5.12) (-4.27) (-4.29)
Peaceyears -0.0594*** -0.0411*** -0.0206 -0.0513*** -0.0313** -0.00351
(-6.43) (-4.68) (-1.75) (-4.65) (-2.91) (-0.28)
Peaceyears2 0.000732*** 0.000537*** 0.000275 0.000674*** 0.000455** 0.0000857
(4.88) (3.96) (1.58) (3.64) (2.75) (0.48)
Peaceyears3 -0.00000235*** -0.00000174** -0.000000858 -0.00000232** -0.00000161* -0.000000321
(-3.84) (-3.25) (-1.28) (-2.95) (-2.45) (-0.46)
N 12334 11662 11030 8864 8230 7618
Region-FE X X X X X X
Year-FE X X X X X X
Z scores in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
iv
A.4 Analysis of female empowerment subcomponents
Table A.4 analyses the relationship between conflict onset and the different sub-components/survey
items, that make up the three indices (political participation, civil liberties and civil society par-
ticipation) that, in turn, aggregate to the FPE index. In the women civil liberties component,
these are freedom of movement, freedom from slavery, property rights and access to justice. In
the women political participation category, these are freedom of dicussion, participation in civil
society organizations and female journalists. In the women’s political participation category, we
find female legislators and power distributed by gender. Table A.4 shows that all have negatively
signed coefficients when entered as regressors. This is to be expected, since the items are such that
positive values indicate more female empowerment. Not all are significantly related to conflict risk,
however: Only female journalists, womens civil society organization participation, access to justice,
and power distributed by gender have significant coefficients.
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A.5 OLS models
Table A.5 replicates the baseline models with OLS instead of logit estimation. This entails that
each model is considered to be a Linear Probability Model. These are less reliant on functional
form assumptions than the logit model, but have other issues relating to heteroscedasticity and
nonsensical point estimates. At any rate, the baseline result is robust and retained in these OLS
Models.
Table A.5: OLS models
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8)
Outcome: Civil conflict onset t+ 1 (COW and UCDP) UCDP
Period: 1817-2013 1900-2013 1946-2013
FPE -0.0192*** -0.0265*** -0.0270** -0.0224* -0.0739*** -0.0787*** -0.0809*** -0.0917**
(-3.62) (-4.18) (-3.22) (-2.02) (-4.22) (-3.35) (-3.94) (-3.23)
GDP p.c. -0.00758*** -0.0141*** -0.00619* -0.0192*** -0.00580 -0.0186**
(-4.11) (-5.91) (-2.33) (-4.27) (-1.94) (-3.23)
L(population) 0.00678*** 0.00375 0.00767*** 0.00532 0.00814*** 0.00380
(6.17) (1.35) (5.54) (0.96) (4.82) (0.54)
Democracy 0.121*** 0.166*** 0.132*** 0.197*** 0.126** 0.230***
(4.49) (6.75) (3.69) (5.55) (2.88) (4.93)
Democracy2 -0.119*** -0.172*** -0.121*** -0.190*** -0.101* -0.222***
(-4.69) (-7.12) (-3.64) (-5.16) (-2.38) (-4.59)
Peaceyears -0.00180*** -0.00121*** -0.00164*** -0.00100*** -0.00159*** -0.000776*** -0.00189*** -0.000681*
(-7.65) (-9.44) (-6.97) (-6.06) (-6.09) (-3.35) (-5.89) (-2.24)
Peaceyears2 0.0000194*** 0.0000142*** 0.0000180*** 0.0000127*** 0.0000175*** 0.0000119*** 0.0000203*** 0.0000116**
(7.39) (8.33) (6.67) (5.75) (5.82) (3.91) (5.65) (2.95)
Peaceyears3 -5.84e-08*** -4.42e-08*** -5.20e-08*** -3.57e-08*** -5.09e-08*** -3.38e-08** -5.76e-08*** -3.23e-08*
(-7.29) (-7.44) (-6.11) (-4.54) (-5.31) (-3.27) (-5.16) (-2.45)
N 22909 24161 17384 17838 11252 11252 8601 8601
Country-FE X X X X
Region-FE X X X X
Year-FE X X X X X X X X
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
vii
A.6 Generalized additive model
Finally, we investigate potential non-linearities in the FPE-conflict relationships. We do this by
estimating a non-parametric Generalized Additive Model, with 5 degrees of freedom. If the FPE
index is non-linearly related to conflict risk, this model would yield a different partial effect of FPE
on conflict for different levels of the FPE index. As can be seen in figure A.1 below, the GAM
model uncovers no strong non-linearities in the relationship.
Figure A.1: Term plot from a Generalized Additive Model with 5 degrees of freedom
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A.7 Models for the causal sensitivity tests
Table A.6: Models used in the causal sensitivity tests
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6)
Outcome: Civil conflict onset t+ 1 (UCDP)
Period: 1946-2013
FPE -0.0656** -0.101*** -0.130*** -0.0954*** -0.112*** -0.135***
(-3.11) (-3.74) (-3.46) (-3.69) (-3.98) (-3.76)
GDP p.c. -0.0165* -0.0181* -0.00655 -0.00775 0.000379
(-2.05) (-2.26) (-0.77) (-0.91) (0.05)
L(population) 0.00599* 0.00622* 0.00559 0.00622* 0.00634
(2.09) (2.13) (1.78) (2.04) (1.85)
Democracy 0.196 0.263* 0.171 0.257* 0.275*
(1.93) (2.42) (1.65) (2.49) (2.50)
Democracy2 -0.126 -0.209 -0.105 -0.178 -0.254
(-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.01) (-1.79) (-1.56)
Peaceyears -0.00216*** -0.00191*** -0.00180*** -0.00194*** -0.00193*** -0.00187***
(-4.28) (-3.75) (-3.63) (-3.67) (-3.72) (-3.53)
Peaceyears2 0.0000224*** 0.0000194** 0.0000182** 0.0000199*** 0.0000197** 0.0000194**
(4.01) (3.32) (3.16) (3.37) (3.18) (3.10)
Peaceyears3 -6.43e-08*** -5.31e-08** -4.91e-08** -5.52e-08** -5.35e-08** -5.36e-08**
(-3.68) (-2.81) (-2.65) (-2.96) (-2.64) (-2.68)
Egalitarian dem. 0.205 0.197
(1.80) (1.79)
liberal dem. -0.216 -0.189
(-1.91) (-1.71)
Participatory dem. -0.0161 -0.0102
(-0.25) (-0.16)
Deliberative dem. 0.0993 0.112
(1.43) (1.62)
Infant mortality -0.000644 -0.000779*
(-1.87) (-2.20)
Fertility rates 0.00330 0.00599
(0.66) (1.21)
Female life exp. -0.00381 -0.00390*
(-1.95) (-2.14)
Education -0.00534 -0.00506
(-1.72) (-1.31)
Urbanization -0.000848 -0.00720
(-0.03) (-0.26)
Inequality -0.00125* -0.00117*
(-2.37) (-2.16)
N 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417 3417
Region-FE X X X X X X
Year-FE X X X X X X
Z scores in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
ix
A.8 First stages for the 2SLS models
Table A.7: First stage estimates for the 2SLS models
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5)
First-stage for the 2SLS models
Outcome: FPE index
Plow -0.0435 -0.0435 -0.0367 -0.0345 -0.104***
(-1.83) (-1.83) (-1.52) (-1.42) (-3.83)
Agriculture 0.0905** 0.0905** 0.0966** 0.0987** 0.150***
(3.03) (3.03) (3.08) (3.11) (4.44)
Matrilocal 0.158 0.182
(1.29) (1.44)
Patrilocal 0.0215
(1.10)
Large animals -0.0459 -0.0459 -0.0511 -0.0475 -0.121
(-0.82) (-0.82) (-0.92) (-0.85) (-1.35)
Tropical climate -0.0980*** -0.0980*** -0.0998*** -0.0968*** -0.169***
(-4.51) (-4.51) (-4.64) (-4.36) (-5.22)
Economic complexity 0.0100 0.0100 0.00873 0.00950 0.0235**
(1.67) (1.67) (1.47) (1.58) (2.87)
Political hierarchies 0.0253* 0.0253* 0.0288* 0.0286* 0.0266
(2.10) (2.10) (2.50) (2.46) (1.92)
Democracy 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.483*** 0.481***
(11.37) (11.37) (11.35) (11.09)
L(population) -0.00533 -0.00533 -0.00640 -0.00571 0.00278
(-1.03) (-1.03) (-1.26) (-1.10) (0.42)
GDP p.c. 0.00107 0.00107 0.00154 0.00441 0.0605***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.15) (0.41) (3.91)
Instrument Plow Plow,agriculture plow,agriculture plow,agriculture plow,agriculture
matrilocality matrilocality,patrilocality
First-stage F value 3.34 6.72 4.71 3.83 19.27
N 166 166 166 166 166
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
A.9 Predictive evaluation
While female political empowerment seems significantly associated with conflict-risk, we also want
to gauge whether it improves our ability to predict civil conflict (see e.g. Ward, Greenhill and
Bakke, 2010). To evaluate this we first investigate whether the FPE index improves in-sample
model performance using Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and Precision-recall curves.
The ROC graphs the sensitivity (the true positive rate) over specificity (the rate of false positives)
for all probability cutoffs classifying an observation as a conflict (1) or not (0). The more area
under the roc curve (AUC) the better the model is at predicting conflict (a random predictor has
an AUC of .5, while a perfect predictor yields an AUC of 1). The precision-recall curve is similar
x
Figure A.2: In-sample AUROC and AUPR for models with and without the FPE index
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to the ROC curve, but is more informative of the model’s ability to predict conflicts (rather than
peace). This is an important additional evaluation tool when faced with imbalanced data (ie.
peace observations dominate). The PR curve plots precision (the true positive rate as a share of all
observations predicted as positives) over the true positive rate, or “recall”. The more area under
the PR-curve, the better the model is at correctly predicting the conflicts that are in the data.
Figure A.2 shows ROC- and Precision-recall curves for the baseline model without the FPE
index (multi-colored line) and the same model including the FPE index (red line). If the FPE
index improves in-sample model performance, the red line should mark more area under the curve
(yielding a higher AUC) than the red line. Looking at figure A.2 we see that this is indeed the
case. A model with FPE included increases the AUROC from .766 to .771 which is a non-trivial
improvement when compared to other predictors of civil war (see e.g., Ward, Greenhill and Bakke,
2010), and the AUPR from .099 to .104. This tells us that a model including FPE as a predictor
is better at classifying conflicts from peace observations in-sample.
While in-sample performance is vital, an even more crucial test is the performance of the FPE
variable out of sample. This tells us whether the FPE-civil conflict link is a robust generalizable
xi
pattern that can travel outside of the estimation sample. To evaluate this, we perform k-fold cross-
validation. This partitions the data into 4 subsets, each representing 1/4th of the data, before
estimating the model on 3/4th of the subsets and deriving predictions for the hold-out set. This is
iterated until each set has been used as a test set. To reduce sensitivity to the data partitioning,
we perform this test 1000 times. For each prediction run, we calculate the Area Under the ROC
curve, giving us an indication of the predictive performance of the model out-of-sample. We then
compare the median AUROC (and AUPR) for models without the female empowerment measure
with the median AUROC (and AUPR) for models that include the female empowerment measure.
After 1000 cross-validation runs, we find that the out-of-sample performance is in fact improved
when you include FPE as a predictor. The median out-of-sample AUROC is .722 when the model
includes the baseline controls but excludes the FPE index, while it rises to .737 when the FPE
index is included. Furthermore, the out-of-sample AUPR is also improved, rising from .085 to
.088 when we include FPE. The results from the 1000 cross-validation runs are visualized in the
appendix. In short, information on female political empowerment in a country improves our ability
to predict whether that country will experience a conflict onset or not, also outside of the data
used for estimation.
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